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Automated decision-making systems, developed using artificial intelligence and machine learning 
processes, are being used by companies, organisations and governments with increasing 
frequency. The purpose of this article is to outline the urgent case for regulating automated 
decision-making and examine the possible options for regulation. This article will argue that New 
Zealand's current approach to regulating decision-making is inadequate. It will then analyse art 
22 of the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation, concluding that this regime also 
has significant flaws. Finally, this article will propose an alternative regulatory solution to 
address the novel challenge posed by automated decision-making. This solution aims to strike a 
balance between the interests of organisations in capitalising on the benefits of automated 
decision-making technology and the interests of individuals in ensuring that their right to freedom 
from discrimination is upheld. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Artificial intelligence is reshaping the world around us.1 The world we live in is increasingly 
customised by thousands of invisible decisions that decide the content we interact with, the 
decisions we make and even our emotions.2 Within the next two decades, advancements in this 
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1  Shoshana Zuboff "The Surveillance Threat is Not What Orwell Imagined" Time (online ed, New York, 6 
June 2019). 
2  Zuboff, above n 1. 
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technology may change the very fabric of human civilisation.3 How we regulate artificial 
intelligence systems is therefore one of the most urgent questions facing humanity.4 This article 
will argue that neither New Zealand's current regulatory framework nor the framework proposed 
by art 22 of the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), is an adequate 
regulatory solution to address the issue of automated decision-making (ADM).5 An alternative 
and innovative approach to law reform in this space is needed for New Zealand to lead the way in 
effectively regulating ADM  and artificial intelligence.  
II UNDERSTANDING AUTOMATED DECISION-MAKING 
(ADM) 
A What is ADM?  
ADM is a term used in the GDPR to refer to decisions made by technological means.6 The 
term covers a broad range of technological processes. At the most simple level, ADM could 
involve a computer applying a mathematical formula that has been predetermined by a human to 
new sets of data.7 At the more complex level, machine learning and narrow artificial intelligence 
systems can be used to generate an automated decision that reflects the computer's interpretation 
of past data.8 Through the use of machine learning technology, computers can be "taught" to 
identify patterns in large data sets.9 The machine then develops a predictive formula based on the 
patterns the machine has observed in the past data. This formula can be applied to new data inputs 
to model the likelihood of different outcomes occurring in the new scenarios.10  
The difference between simplistic and more complex ADM can be illustrated with an 
example. If an employer knows they want to hire a university graduate, they could write a formula 
  
3  Tad Friend "How Frightened Should We Be of AI?" The New Yorker (online ed, New York, 7 May 2018). 
4  Meredith Whittaker and others AI Now Report 2018 (AI Now Institute, December 2018) at 7.  
5  Regulation 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1, art 22 [GDPR].  
6  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and 
Profiling for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679 (17/EN WP 251, 6 February 2018) at 8 [Working Party 
29 Guidelines]. 
7  John Zerilli and others "Transparency in Algorithmic and Human Decision-Making: Is There a Double 
Standard?" (2019) 32 Philosophy & Technology 661 at 663. 
8  Working Party 29 Guidelines, above n 6, at 4. 
9  Russell Brown "Actually Interesting: A machine can make decisions but can it ever understand why?" (1 
August 2019) The Spinoff <https://thespinoff.co.nz>. 
10  Brown, above n 9.  
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which filtered out the CVs of prospective candidates without a university degree. In this case, the 
computer would be applying a set formula that has been predetermined by a human.11 Under this 
formula, the human has decided that they will only hire candidates with a university degree, and 
the computer has efficiently applied that decision to the data it is given by filtering out candidates 
without a degree.  
In contrast, if an employer intended to use a machine learning system to filter the CVs of 
prospective job candidates, they would give the machine a database of the CVs of past candidates, 
identified by those who were successful and those who were not. Using this information the 
machine learning system would determine a formula by which CVs should be screened out.12 In 
this case, the human is not fully aware of what patterns the computer might recognise in the past 
data and apply to new applicants.13 The computer might recognise, for example, that based on the 
past data, features of a candidate correlate more strongly to their being offered the job than 
whether they have a university degree. For example, if there was a higher proportion of Pākehā 
applicants who had been successful in obtaining the role in the past, when compared to the 
proportion of applicants of other ethnicities, the computer might assume that being Pākehā is a 
stronger predictor of a successful candidate, than having a university degree. This could lead the 
computer to perpetuate systemic racism, allowing Pākehā applicants without a degree to pass a 
screening process whereas applicants of other ethnicities would have been rejected.14    
This article will focus on the latter type of automated decisions, produced through machine 
learning and "big data" processes. It is the use of these intelligent systems to generate automated 
decisions through pattern recognition which represents a novel shift in human decision-making 
processes.15 Such a shift warrants a thorough analysis of the legal implications and problems 
created by ADM technology. 
B Where is ADM Currently Used?  
ADM is currently being used across a plethora of different areas in our society, ranging from 
the seemingly mundane or trivial, to more important decisions. ADM is used to tell us which TV 
show on Netflix we should watch next and to control the content we see in our Facebook 
  
11  Zerilli and others, above n 7, at 3.  
12  Cathy O'Neil "How can we stop algorithms telling lies?" The Guardian (online ed, London, 16 July 2017). 
13  Cathy O'Neil Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens 
Democracy (Crown Publishing Group, New York, 2016) at 8–10.  
14  There are multiple real life examples similar to this one. See for example Jeffrey Dastin "Amazon scraps 
secret AI recruiting tool that showed bias against women" (10 October 2018) Thompson Reuters 
<www.reuters.com>.  
15  Eliana Herrera-Vega "Artificial Intelligence and law" [2019] NZLJ 64 at 67.  
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Newsfeeds every day.16 In the United States, the technology has been used to assist judicial 
decisions on criminal sentencing, determine police resource allocation and determine 
performance-based pay for teachers.17 In all of these cases, the algorithms behind these decisions 
are highly complex, based on multiple factors which are continuously being adjusted.18 
New Zealand has been slower in adopting ADM technology compared to the United States, 
however it is beginning to be used.19 A report from Statistics New Zealand has documented the 
use of algorithms by the public sector.20 ADM is currently being used by the Accident 
Compensation Corporation (ACC) to process claims for accident cover that are submitted.21 The 
algorithm was developed to analyse past claims data and determine a formula for identifying 
claims that are "complex" and need to be referred to a human and claims which are straightforward 
and can be approved straight away.22 Though the system does not have the power to grant a person 
cover, this use of past data to design a filtering system for claims may result in inequities. It is 
possible, for example, that claimants with pre-existing health conditions or disabilities may be 
classified as "complex" even when they have a simple claim for an accident. Such a classification 
would be based on the fact that in past data similar claimants were less likely to have their cover 
approved because ACC does not provide cover for issues arising from pre-existing medical 
conditions. The possible issues arising from reasonably minor uses of ADM such as this 
demonstrate the need for regulatory attention to this issue.23 This is particularly so given that 
public and private actors in New Zealand are likely to adopt ADM technologies at increasing scale 
over the coming years. 
  
16   Wall Room Media "Facebook Newsfeed Algorithm History" <https://wallaroomedia.com>; and Libby 
Plummer "This is how Netflix's top-secret recommendation system works" (22 August 2017) Wired 
<www.wired.co.uk>. 
17  Julia Angwin and others "Machine Bias" (23 May 2016) ProPublica <www.propublica.org>; and O'Neil 
Weapons of Math Destruction, above n 13, at 4, 85 and 139.  
18  Stuart Dredge "How does Facebook decide what to show in my news feed?" The Guardian (online ed, 
London, 30 June 2014); and Alex Hern "Why Facebook's news feed is changing and how it will affect 
you" The Guardian (online ed, London, 12 January 2018).  
19  AI Forum New Zealand Artificial Intelligence: Shaping a Future New Zealand (May 2018). 
20  Statistics New Zealand Algorithm Assessment Report (October 2018). 
21  At 23.  
22  At 23. 
23  Cathy O'Neil "When Not to Trust the Algorithm" Harvard Business Review (online ed, Massachusetts, 6 
October 2018). 
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C The Opportunities and Risks of ADM  
ADM offers an unparalleled opportunity to improve efficiency within organisations.24 By 
automating decisions, businesses and organisations can reduce the amount of human employee 
time spent on basic decision-making tasks, enabling businesses to cut costs or direct their 
employees' time towards more valuable activities.25 In addition, technologist Hal Varian has noted 
the potential business opportunities that ADM creates for content, products and services which 
are more tailored to individual customers' preferences than ever before.26 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) estimates that such developments in ADM will increase global 
GDP by 14 per cent by 2030, an increase of USD 15.7 trillion.27 
However, despite the economic opportunities created by ADM, this technology also presents 
some risks. As the ACC example illustrates, ADM has the potential to amplify discriminatory 
trends and erode human dignity. One of the key attractions of ADM initially was its potential to 
reduce "human bias" in decision-making processes.28 However, as Cathy O'Neil has exposed, this 
is a false expectation of ADM technology.29 Machine learning systems are based on combining 
past data and a definition of success, neither of which are objective.30 Past data frequently reflects 
pre-existing discriminatory trends and definitions of success are often based upon assumptions 
held by dominant cultures, ignoring the experiences of marginalised groups.31 O'Neil draws on 
examples from education, banking, recruitment and healthcare to argue that far from eliminating 
"human bias" in decision-making, destructive uses of ADM amplify that bias.32 Operating 
completely opaquely, unregulated algorithms can automate the same patterns of discrimination 
  
24  Anand S Rao and Gerard Verweij Sizing the prize: What's the real value of AI for your business and how 
can you capitalise? (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2017). 
25  At 1. 
26  At 4; and Hal R Varian "Beyond Big Data" (paper presented to the NABE Annual Meeting, San 
Francisco, 10 September 2013) at 4. 
27  Rao and Verweij, above n 24, at 1.   
28  Maddy Savage "Meet Tengai, the job interview robot who won't judge you" (12 March 2019) BBC News 
<www.bbc.com>; and Andrea Gallego and others "How AI Could Help—or Hinder—Women in the 
Workforce" (13 May 2019) Boston Consulting Group <www.bcg.com/publications>. 
29  O'Neil "When Not to Trust the Algorithm", above n 23.   
30  O'Neil "When Not to Trust the Algorithm", above n 23. 
31  WGBHForum "Cathy O'Neil: How It's Unfair to Use Personality Tests in Hiring" (21 July 2017) 
YouTube <www.youtube.com>; and Luciano Floridi "What the Near Future of Artificial Intelligence 
Could Be" (2019) 32 Philosophy & Technology 1 at 4. 
32  O'Neil Weapons of Math Destruction, above n 13. 
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on grounds such as race, gender and sexuality which have been prevalent throughout history.33 
Widespread use of these algorithms therefore can exacerbate pre-existing social inequities and 
violates the right of individuals to be free from discrimination, often in the name of making society 
fairer.34 
Subjecting individuals to ADM also poses a threat to the human dignity of individuals. 
Popular literature has frequently explored situations where humans lose control over or become 
controlled by machines.35 This reflects a powerful fear in society of our lives being determined 
by alien forces we do not understand or trust. The use of ADM systems to make significant 
decisions that affect people's lives, including loans, employment, healthcare and insurance, strikes 
up against this underlying fear.36 As individuals, we may feel a sense of powerlessness, that our 
distinctive and varied experience is being determined by a set of code that cannot even be 
explained to us.37 In addition, collectively, our dignity as a society may also be threatened. Where 
we allow such systems to be used, unregulated, knowing that they may encode inequality, we 
undermine the fundamental core of dignity we expect all humans to be allowed; and subject some 
among us to the unfeeling, mercenary logic of discriminatory machines.38  
ADM systems offer the possibility of making significant decisions about individuals fairer 
and more efficient. Yet at the same time, the opaque, unchallengeable nature of some ADM 
systems and their heavy reliance on past data means there is a real threat that these systems will 
automate discriminatory patterns and, if unregulated, undermine individual and collective human 
dignity. 
III THE CASE FOR REGULATION OF ADM   
A Why Regulate?  
The proliferation of ADM systems presents opportunities and challenges for both 
organisations and individuals. Whilst New Zealand might currently be behind the rest of the world 
in the large-scale adoption of ADM, our organisations and businesses are likely to catch up to 
these global trends over the next few years, meaning there is a need to ensure that the New Zealand 
  
33  O'Neil "When Not to Trust the Algorithm", above n 23; and Kate Crawford "Artificial Intelligence's 
White Guy Problem" The New York Times (online ed, New York, 25 June 2016). 
34  O'Neil "When Not to Trust the Algorithm", above n 23; and Kate Crawford "Artificial Intelligence—
With Very Real Biases" Wall Street Journal (online ed, New York, 17 October 2017). 
35  Some example texts include Mary Shelley's Frankenstein published in 1818, popular film The Matrix 
released in 1999 and popular television series Black Mirror that first premiered in 2011. 
36  Friend, above n 3. 
37  Friend, above n 3. 
38  O'Neil Weapons of Math Destruction, above n 13, at 10.  
 ENCODING INEQUALITY 7 
regulatory framework is fit-for-purpose.39 Effective regulation in the field of ADM should enable 
us to balance the benefits offered by ADM, with the need to ensure that individuals are protected 
from discriminatory decision-making and that human dignity is preserved.  
Balanced regulation of ADM could involve numerous options, including establishing 
prohibitions on ADM for certain significant decisions about individuals, requiring organisations 
to undertake an "audit" of ADM systems, or establishing review processes for individuals to 
challenge the results of ADM.40 Improving transparency over ADM systems may also assist with 
ensuring ADM is conducted correctly and fairly; however transparency should not be seen as the 
silver bullet solution for regulation of ADM.41   
B Is New Zealand's Current Regulatory Framework Adequate?  
New Zealand does not have a single statute that directly addresses ADM. The Privacy Bill 
2018 offered one opportunity for Parliament to explore the adequacy of New Zealand's regulatory 
coverage of ADM, however this opportunity was passed over.42 At the Select Committee stage, 
several submitters, including the Privacy Commissioner, John Edwards, submitted that ADM 
regulation should be included in the Bill in order to improve transparency in automated decisions 
and increase individuals' control over the use of their personal data in these processes.43 These 
submissions were rejected by the Justice Select Committee.44 The Committee argued that New 
Zealand's current legislation adequately covered ADM and, in addition, humans, not computers, 
are making almost all of the most significant decisions affecting individuals in New Zealand.45 
The following two sections will challenge both of these claims, arguing that New Zealand's 
current regulatory environment is not fit to regulate ADM and that even if humans are involved 
  
39  PricewaterhouseCoopers Storm clouds and silver linings: what's the outlook for New Zealand CEOs?  
(February 2019) at 3.  
40  GDPR, art 22; Rumman Chowdhury and Narendra Mulani "Auditing Algorithms for Bias" Harvard 
Business Review (online ed, Massachusetts, 24 October 2018); and O'Neil "When Not to Trust the 
Algorithm", above n 23. 
41  Statistics New Zealand and the Privacy Commissioner Principles for the safe and effective use of data 
and analytics (May 2018); Cade Metz "Seeking Ground Rules for AI" The New York Times (online ed, 
New York, 1 March 2019); and Colin Gavaghan and others Government Use of Artificial Intelligence in 
New Zealand: Final Report on Phase 1 of the New Zealand Law Foundation's Artificial Intelligence and 
the Law in New Zealand Project (New Zealand Law Foundation, 2019) at 57.  
42  Privacy Bill 2018 (34–2), cl 3. 
43  John Edwards "Submission to the Justice Select Committee on the Privacy Bill 2018" at 29–30; and 
Gehan Gunasekara "Submission to the Justice Select Committee on the Privacy Bill 2018" at 3.  
44  Privacy Bill 2018 (34–2) (select committee report) at 39–40.  
45  At 39–40.   
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in all uses of ADM in New Zealand, the research on automation bias demonstrates there is still 
pressing need for regulation of ADM processes. 
1 The limited efficacy of New Zealand regulations in the context of ADM  
Contrary to the Justice Committee's assertion, regulation of ADM in New Zealand is limited. 
Whilst the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA) requires public parties to exercise a minimum 
degree of transparency when using ADM, there is no legislative requirement that private parties 
be similarly transparent. This makes it unlikely that the Human Rights Act 1993 (HRA) could be 
effectively utilised by individuals to challenge discriminatory ADM by private parties. In addition, 
even where the OIA does apply, such as for decisions made by public parties, it is possible that 
the opaque nature of ADM technology may mean that a claimant has insufficient evidence of 
discriminatory decision-making to be able to meet the standard of proof under the HRA. A brief 
review of the available legislative avenues will discuss these issues in more detail. 
Individuals can use the OIA to demand that a Crown agency provide reasons for a decision 
that is made using an ADM function.46 Section 22 provides that individuals have a right to access 
the "internal rules" of government departments or agencies which are used to inform decisions 
made by that agency.47 These rules or policies can be withheld only if there is good reason for 
doing so.48 Individuals or organisations could accordingly use 22 to require a government agency 
to disclose the rules that inform the decision the agency makes automatically, such as a rule that 
student applicants earning over a certain income level will be denied a government-funded student 
allowance. In addition, under s 23 of the Act, individuals have a right to be provided with the 
specific reasoning behind decisions which affect them.49 This could include decisions made by 
social welfare agencies, education providers or other Crown entities.50 Under this section 
individuals could use s 23 to require an agency to disclose the reasoning behind a particular use 
of  automated decision that affected them. For example, if they were the student applying for a 
student allowance, they would be told the particular reasons it was denied in their case, such as 
that their income was over a certain level. 
The transparency requirements under the OIA may help individuals to bring a claim under the 
HRA against public parties for the use of discriminatory decision-making processes. It is illegal 
to discriminate against citizens on any of the prohibited grounds established in s 21(1) of the Act, 
which includes race, gender, sexual orientation and religion. A claimant could use the OIA to 
  
46  Official Information Act 1982, ss 22–23 [OIA].  
47  Section 22.  
48  Section 22(4).  
49  Section 23(1). 
50  Schedule 1.  
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force a public party to divulge information about the reasons for an automated decision and, if 
these reasons were discriminatory, the claimant could bring a claim under the HRA. 
Nevertheless, because the OIA does not apply to private parties, there is no legislative 
requirement that private parties provide any rationale for decisions made automatically.51 Without 
any information about the reasons for a decision, a claimant would lack the evidence to argue 
under the HRA that the decision was made on one of the prohibited grounds in s 21(1). Therefore, 
in order for statutes such as the HRA to provide a remedy for discriminatory ADM, some 
disclosure requirements would need to be enforced against private operators of ADM systems. 
One example of where disclosure is currently being enforced is the Credit Reporting Privacy 
Code 2004 which places disclosure requirements on private parties in the limited context of 
generating credit scores. This Code could be used to require private parties, who are using ADM 
to generate credit scores, to disclose how these scores are produced.52 Under r 6(2A), when an 
individual is given access to a credit score, they must also be provided with a statement outlining 
the methodology used to create the score, the information used and the range their score is placed 
within.53 This information could enable an individual to bring a claim for breach of s 21 of the 
HRA if their credit score was automatically created on a prohibited ground. However, this Code 
clearly has a limited application, and will be of no assistance to claimants seeking to challenge 
the use of ADM to make other significant decisions affecting them. 
Yet even if claimants have enough evidence, obtained through the OIA or the Credit Reporting 
Privacy Code, to bring a claim under s 21, they may face another challenge in proving that the 
ADM produced results based on a prohibited ground. Discrimination in ADM systems frequently 
emerges, not through inclusion of the protected ground itself, but through another data source 
which acts as a proxy for that characteristic.54 For example, a person may not have disclosed their 
ethnicity on Facebook, but may have entered their postcode when purchasing something on a site 
where Facebook is embedded. Postcodes are proven to sometimes operate as a proxy for race.55 
Such discrimination by proxy may make it harder for claimants to prove discrimination has 
occurred on the basis of a prohibited ground in s 21. It therefore remains to be seen whether 
  
51  OIA, sch 1.  
52  Credit Reporting Privacy Code 2004, r 6(2A). 
53  Rule 6(2A).  
54  Anupam Datta and others "Proxy Discrimination in Data-Driven Systems: Theory and Experiments with 
Machine Learnt Programs" (25 July 2017) arXiv <https://arXiv.org> at 1–2. 
55  At 3; and Louise Matsakis "Facebook's Ad System Might Be Hard–Coded for Discrimination" (4 June 
2019) Wired <www.wired.com>.  
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sufficient information or explanation regarding how an opaque ADM system is functioning could 
be obtained to enable a claimant to satisfy the discrimination standard required by the HRA.    
New Zealand's current regulatory oversight of ADM is clearly insufficient. The next section 
will examine whether this is counterbalanced by the inclusion of human involvement in ADM 
processes in New Zealand. 
2 Human involvement in ADM: An antidote to the challenge of regulation?  
The Select Committee's second argument against regulating ADM was that humans, not 
computers remain involved in all major decisions.56 This section argues that even when humans 
are involved in making decisions with the use of ADM tools, oversight of these tools is needed. 
ADM can be used in combination with human decision-making to varying extents.57 The table 
below illustrates the spectrum of human involvement that might be included in ADM processes.58 
In all of the situations ranging from 2–10, ADM will have some effect on the decision outcome:59 
Automation level  Automation Description  
1 
The computer offers no assistance: human must take all decision 
and actions.  
2 
The computer offers a complete set of decision/action alternatives, 
or  
3 narrows the selection down to a few, or  
4 suggests one alternative, and  
5 executes that suggestion if the human approves, or  
6 
allows the human a restricted time to veto before automatic 
execution, or  
7 executes automatically, then necessarily informs humans and  
  
56  Privacy Bill (select committee report), above n 44, at 40. 
57  ML Cummings "Automation Bias in Intelligent Time Critical Decision Support Systems" (paper 
presented to American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 1st Intelligent Systems Technical 
Conference, Chicago, Illinois, 20–22 September 2004) at 1.  
58  At 2. 
59  At 2. 
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8 informs the human only if asked, or 
9 informs the human only if it, the computer, decides to.  
10 The computer decides everything and acts autonomously, ignoring 
the human. 
The centre of the human involvement spectrum – or the middle section of this table – is 
particularly interesting because in these situations, the ADM system is heavily influential even 
though a human is involved. In scenarios 3–6 the human plays no role in designing the proposed 
solution, they merely select from the list available or approve or veto the computer's selection.60 
This is a passive role. The human is relying heavily on the accuracy of the ADM system to select 
the correct list of options and propose the best one.61  
This kind of human–computer decision-making requires regulation for two reasons. First, if 
the ADM system is biased in any way, this bias is likely to translate straight into the human's 
decision.62 In these examples, the human decision-maker is not privy to the list of rejected options 
and does not have sufficient information to consider possible options the computer might have 
missed. Therefore, even with the best of intentions, humans do not have sufficient oversight to 
spot instances of bias or inaccuracy in the ADM system and to mitigate these to produce a fair 
result.63   
In addition, humans have been shown to engage in automation bias when presented with a 
decision generated by a machine.64 Automation bias refers to the tendency of humans to ignore 
or fail to seek out contrary evidence when presented with an automated decision. Humans are 
likely to assume the automated decision presented is correct.65 Extensive studies have been done 
on automation bias in the aviation sector, where ADM processes are heavily relied upon in 
complex environments such as route configuration or air traffic control.66 In one study on 
  
60  At 2. 
61  At 2. 
62  At 5. 
63  At 5.  
64  Eugenio Alberdi and others "Why are People's Decisions Sometimes Worse with Computer Support?" 
(paper presented to Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security 28th International Conference, Hamburg, 
Germany, 15–18 September 2009) at 2. 
65  At 1.  
66  Cummings, above n 57, at 3–4. 
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automation bias, pilots were given an automated solution to a flight route configuration.67 Over 
40 per cent demonstrated over-reliance on the solution, completing none of their own decision-
making and accepting flight plans that were significantly substandard.68 
Therefore, in both fully automated and partially automated decision-making systems, 
regulation is needed to ensure that the systems are accurate and free from bias. The design of 
human–computer decision-making systems and the phenomenon of automation bias means that 
we cannot trust that the mere presence of a human, often with limited oversight into the ADM 
process, will mitigate the risk of a biased or inaccurate result.69 Given the inadequacy of New 
Zealand's regulatory environment, urgent attention should be paid to developing regulations to 
provide much needed oversight of ADM systems, even where a human is involved.  
IV THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION 
(GDPR) AS AN EXEMPLAR REGULATORY INSTRUMENT  
This Part will analyse the regulatory solutions proposed in the GDPR to address ADM and 
what this regime might offer to regulators looking to legislate ADM in a New Zealand context. It 
will conclude that art 22 of the GDPR, which covers ADM, fails to strike an appropriate balance 
between the interests of organisations utilising ADM and the interests of individuals. Instead of 
creating a holistic regulatory framework designed to manage this balance, art 22 merely creates a 
strict prohibition on ADM that applies only to an extremely narrow range of cases. 
A Introduction to the GDPR and Art 22 
The GDPR entered into force in the European Union in April 2016, applying from May 
2018.70 The Regulation applies to all businesses doing business in the European Union, and in 
some circumstances, to businesses operating outside of the Union.71 The Regulation covers the 
relationship between data controllers (parties with control over the means and purposes for which 
personal data is processed) and data subjects (individuals whose personal data is being used in 
these processes).72 For consistency this article will use the word "organisation" to describe a data 
controller, and "individual" or "person" when referring to a "data subject". 
  
67  At 4. 
68  At 4. 
69  Alberdi and others, above n 64, at 1. 
70  Russell McVeagh Information Sheet for GDPR (May 2018). 
71  Article 3. 
72  Articles 4(1) and (4).  
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Article 22 of the GDPR explicitly addresses ADM. It provides that individuals shall have 
the:73 
… right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, 
which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.  
Article 22(1) operates as a general prohibition on "solely … automated processing" for 
decisions that "significantly affect" individuals. There are three exceptions to the prohibition, 
covered in art 22(2). These are:  
(a) where the decision is necessary for entering into or performing a contract;  
(b) where the decision is authorised by Member state law;  
(c) and where the decision is based on the individual's explicit consent.  
Article 22 was initially misinterpreted as a "right to an explanation provision" for automated 
decisions.74 This interpretation has since been proven incorrect by legal experts who affirmed that 
art 22 is a prohibition clause on the use of ADM in certain contexts.75  
1 Effect of arts 13 and 15 in regards to ADM 
Article 22 is the best option for a remedy in the case of automated decision making. Articles 
13 and 15 of the GDPR do offer a possible avenue through which an explanation of ADM might 
be obtained, however this is likely to be limited. Article 13 requires that an organisation 
undertaking ADM must notify the affected individual or individuals that ADM will take place and 
provide "meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the 
envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject".76 Article 15 provides that 
individuals have a right of access to the same information. 
However, as Wachter and others and Edwards and Veale have pointed out, the explanation 
that is required by arts 13 and 15 is merely an ex ante explanation.77 It requires individuals to be 
told general information about how the automated decision will be made. There is no requirement 
  
73  Article 22(1).  
74  House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence AI in the UK: ready, willing and able? (HL 
Paper 100, Report of Session 2017–2019, 26 April 2018) at [101].  
75  Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt and Luciano Floridi "Why a Right to Explanation of Automated 
Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation" (2017) 7 IDPL 76 at 77–
78. 
76  GDPR, art 13(2)(f). 
77  Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale "Slave to the Algorithm? Why a 'Right to an Explanation' is Probably 
Not the Remedy You Are Looking For" (2017) 16 Duke Law & Technology Review 18 at 52. 
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that individuals be provided with an explanation of the logic of the decision as it relates to their 
case, such as the specific reasons they were denied a loan, for example.78 
The scope of arts 13 and 15 and their application to ADM cases will likely be elucidated 
further as case law emerges. Current interpretations support the view that these two articles only 
allow individuals to access a general explanation of decision-making systems and their foreseen 
consequences, rather than an in-depth explanation of the decision process as it relates to their case, 
which could enable an individual to contest a decision. We therefore must return our attention to 
art 22 because it is the provision that shows the most promise in offering a remedy to individuals 
in respect of ADM under the GDPR.  
B Does Art 22 Effectively Regulate ADM?   
This sub-Part analyses several areas of art 22, the prohibition clause. This will include the two 
limbs of the legal test: whether the decision was made "based solely on automated processing"; 
and whether the decision produced legal effects or "similarly significantly" affected an individual, 
as well as two of the exceptions to the general rule: the exception where the individual consents; 
and the contract exception. Ultimately, this sub-Part will conclude that art 22 fails to balance the 
interests of organisations with the rights of individuals and does little to regulate ADM as used in 
practice.  
1 Limb one of the art 22 test: "Solely Automated" decisions   
For art 22 to apply, a decision must be "based solely on automated processing".79 The word 
"solely" requires interpretation. The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, a European Union 
advisory body formed to provide guidelines on the interpretation of art 22, defined "based solely" 
to mean that the decision was made "without human involvement".80 This is supported by the 
synonyms of "solely": "entirely" or "exclusively",81 and by the ordinary usage interpretation, as a 
lay person would likely assume "based solely on automated processes" to mean that the decision 
needs to be made only by a machine. 
The Working Party guidelines also specify that superficial human involvement in decision-
making does not suffice and that humans must have "meaningful" oversight with sufficient 
authority and competence to change the result in order for a decision to not be made "solely" by 
a machine.82 The underlying assumption in this provision is the same assumption made by the 
  
78  At 52; and Wachter, Mittelstadt and Floridi, above n 75, at 83. 
79  Article 22(1). 
80  Working Party 29 Guidelines, above n 6, at 8. 
81  "Definition of 'solely'" Collins Dictionary <www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary>. 
82  Working Party 29 Guidelines, above n 6, at 21.  
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Justice Select Committee on the New Zealand Privacy Bill.83 The assumption is that through 
human involvement, the risks associated with ADM can be avoided. The case of State v Loomis 
will be used to build further on the arguments mentioned in Part III; that restricting regulation to 
solely automated decisions ignores the obvious risks of involving humans in ADM processes, 
prohibiting the most extreme uses of ADM while providing no oversight over other, similarly 
impactful, uses of the technology. 
State v Loomis concerned the use of the automated tool COMPAS to inform judicial decisions 
on sentencing.84 COMPAS was designed for the United States Department of Corrections by a 
private company, Northpointe Inc.85 The algorithm was developed using past data on criminal 
recidivism among individuals.86 It used information from the defendant's criminal file and an 
interview with the defendant to produce three "risk scores".87 In Mr Loomis' case the trial judge 
used his COMPAS score, along with other factors including the seriousness of Mr Loomis' crime 
and his criminal history to deliver a relatively lengthy sentence that reflected an extremely high 
risk of reoffending.88 Mr Loomis argued that COMPAS had increased his risk profile on the basis 
of his male gender and therefore that the Court was engaging in unconstitutional discrimination 
on the basis of sex.89 
The primary issue when applying art 22(1) to the facts of State v Loomis is whether the trial 
Judge's decision in this case was based "solely" on the automated processing completed by 
COMPAS. The Judge's decision on sentencing would likely not be considered to be "solely 
automated", under the definition identified earlier. The Judge took into account other factors in 
addition to the COMPAS score, including the defendant's criminal history and the seriousness of 
the crime.90 The Judge was not bound to apply the COMPAS rating strictly; they had the power 
and competence to change the decision outcome.91 
This case clearly highlights the two problems with relying on human involvement to alleviate 
the need for regulation of ADM systems. First, human decision-makers using ADM tools 
  
83  Privacy Bill (select committee report), above n 44, at 39–40.   
84  State v Loomis 881 NW 2d 749 (Wis 2016) at [4].   
85  At [6].  
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87  At [6]–[7].  
88  At [7]. 
89  At [13]–[14].  
90  At [44].  
91  At [5]; and Working Party 29 Guidelines, above n 6, at 21.  
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frequently do not have oversight over the ADM process itself. The trial Judge in State v Loomis 
was not aware of how COMPAS generated its risk scores nor what weighting was assigned to the 
different characteristics and attributes of the defendant's profile.92 The power of the Judge only 
included the ability to take the COMPAS score, consider other factors and make the final 
sentencing decision. The underlying assumption of the "solely automated" limb is therefore 
undermined because the Judge had no oversight over the ADM which would have enabled them 
to identify and mitigate potential biases within it.93 Here, the human involvement provided no 
additional assurance that the COMPAS algorithm was fair and accurate. Secondly, human–
computer decision-making systems such as COMPAS cause automation bias in human decision-
makers. Even if the Judge in State v Loomis was presented with evidence that the COMPAS result 
was unfair, evidence shows that it is likely that the Judge would defer to the automated decision, 
rather than challenge it.94 
The narrow scope of art 22 therefore has the effect of restricting the provision to apply to a 
very limited number of cases where there is no human involvement.95 The result is that significant 
uses of ADM processes, such as the COMPAS algorithm, are subject to no regulatory oversight.  
2 Limb two of the art 22 test: Legal effects or "similarly significant" effects  
Under the second limb of the art 22 test, a decision must be one with legal effects or "similarly 
significant" effects for the individual. However, this definition of "similarly significant" effects 
imposes too big a restriction on the range of situations where art 22 can apply. 
The Article 29 Working Party defined "legal effects" as decisions that affect a person's legal 
rights, such as the freedom to vote, entitlement to social benefits, or the granting of citizenship.96 
They found that to be "similarly significant" to these legal effects, a decision must have the 
potential to significantly affect the choices, behaviour or circumstances of the individual, have a 
prolonged impact on the individual or lead to the discrimination of the individual.97 The Working 
Party stated that decisions affecting access to healthcare or employment would fall into this 
category.98 On the other hand, the Working Party used online advertising as an example of ADM 
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that would not typically "similarly significantly" affect individuals.99 As an exception to this 
general rule, the Working Party said that an automated advertisement for a high interest loan that 
targeted an individual in a precarious financial situation could meet the threshold of producing a 
"similarly significant" effect.100 
This definition of "similarly significantly affects" is based on a binary model of one decision 
directly causing a significant effect on a person's life. In the loan example, this "tipping point" 
where the effect is created is the moment where the individual takes out the loan after seeing the 
advertisement. However, this model fails to reflect the "immersion effect" that individuals 
experience within heavily personalised, deliberately constructed online environments.101 On 
social media platforms like Facebook, hundreds of decisions are made almost instantly about the 
content that should be presented to individuals in order to optimise their engagement on the 
platform, thereby increasing "clicks" or site purchases.102 
The effect of these environments on individuals is insidious and gradual.103 It will not always 
be possible to identify the exact "tipping point" where one decision had a significant effect on an 
individual. For example on Facebook, advertisements on dieting and methods to reduce body 
weight may be targeted at a person based on the fact that their past activity on the site reveals that 
they are someone who exhibits symptoms of anxiety and negative body image.104 Individually, 
the decision to show each of these ads is unlikely to be found to produce a "significant" effect for 
the individual.105 The individual might ignore the ads sometimes, whilst other times the ads may 
lead them to restrict their food intake. However, continued exposure to this advertising could 
"snowball" and lead the individual to develop an eating disorder.106 The contraction of a mental 
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illness is clearly a significant effect on an individual. However, because the effect is developed 
gradually through continuous exposure to the ads it would be impossible to prove that one 
automated decision had produced that effect and thus that the ADM use should be prohibited 
under art 22.107 
In summary, art 22 creates an arbitrary distinction between effects immediately produced by 
a single automated decision and effects which manifest gradually through long term exposure to 
a series of automated decisions. However individuals in both scenarios are likely to experience 
the same exploitation of their particular vulnerabilities through ADM that in turn produces 
similarly significant effects on their lives. This makes the distinction unjustifiable. 
3 Exception where an individual consents  
Even where limbs one and two of the legal test under art 22 are satisfied, three broad 
exceptions to the general rule limit the article's application. The first exception is where the 
decision-making is completed with the individual's "explicit consent".108 This exception is 
consistent with the GDPR principle of enabling individuals to exercise control over their own 
data.109 However the exception requires closer analysis. Across all areas of privacy law, 
increasing scepticism has been raised about the effectiveness of consent as a mechanism for 
regulating privacy intrusive data management systems.110 
"Consent fatigue" is a term that has been coined to describe the reduced ability of individuals 
to offer genuine consent in new online environments.111 When individuals are constantly asked 
to give consent on online platforms through click-wrap contracts which are impossibly long and 
stand in the way of a social or entertainment reward, people are more likely to blindly offer their 
consent, often without reading the terms.112 If users do not understand what they are consenting 
to, have no option to opt-out of processing without being excluded from a digital platform or are 
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unable to make "rational trade-offs" between the privacy risk and associated benefits,113 consent 
cannot operate as an effective "shield" to protect users from the negative effects of privacy 
intrusive systems.114  
Article 7 sets out the conditions for consenting to processing in the GDPR. Consent for 
processing must be presented distinctively in an "intelligible and easily accessible form, using 
clear and plain language".115 However, as discussed, it remains to be seen whether placing these 
kind of requirements around how consent should be obtained will actually overcome the core 
issue of consent fatigue and reinstate consent as a meaningful check operating to prevent 
individuals from exposing themselves to exploitative and harmful uses of their personal data.  
Article 7(4) of the GDPR offers one area which could help to ensure consent is meaningful. 
This article states that when determining whether consent has been "freely given", consideration 
should be given to whether "the performance of a contract … is conditional on consent to the 
processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract". This 
technically makes it more difficult for organisations to engage in ADM using personal data where 
the use of that data is not necessary for the contract with the customer to be performed. However 
the strength of this provision has not yet been tested.  
Plaintiff Maximilian Schrems is contending before the Vienna Regional Council that 
Facebook operates in breach of art 7(4) of the GDPR because the processing of individuals' 
personal data for the purposes of supplying advertising on Facebook is not "necessary" for the 
performance of Facebook's contracts with its users.116 Facebook has argued that Facebook users 
"order" advertising when they sign up for Facebook and therefore that the processing of their 
personal data for the purposes of supplying advertising is within the scope of the contract. Based 
on the outcome of this case, it remains to be seen whether art 7(4) will provide adequate protection 
for users against the exploitation of their personal data for purposes tangential to their contracts 
with data controllers such as Facebook.  Given that ADM may be used in the future to provide 
individuals with critical services such as bank loans and health insurance, there is a need for 
regulations to ensure that individuals are able to consent to the use of ADM without being subject 
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to additional processing of their data where that data may not be necessary for the provision of 
the service.117  
4 Exception for entering into a contract   
Another exception to art 22(1) is where the use of ADM "is necessary for entering into, or 
performance of, a contract between the data subject and a data controller".118 This exception gives 
rise to two problems: first, it can be interpreted very broadly; and secondly it creates inconsistent 
standards on ADM use for organisations. 
According to the Article 29 Working Party, to prove that ADM was "necessary" under this 
exception, the organisation or data controller must demonstrate a lack of an equally effective and 
less privacy-intrusive means to achieve the same commercial objective.119 The Working Party 
used the example of a business that receives thousands of applications for a job. Finding it 
impractical to sift through all the applications manually, the business automates the process of CV 
screening. According to the Working Party, this example would meet the definition of 
"necessary"; there is no equally effective, less privacy means to sort the applications. 120 
The broad interpretation of "necessary" in article 22 as commercially necessary means that 
this exception has the potential to apply to a large range of commercial interactions between 
organisations and individuals. For example, if an employer has thousands of employees and their 
employment contracts require a performance review, the employer could argue that ADM is 
"necessary" for performance of the contract because it would be impractical to complete 
performance reviews without it.121 Therefore the exception for contract creation makes substantial 
allowance for organisations and their need for efficiency, without adequately protecting the rights 
of individuals. Many of the situations where individuals most need protection from the potential 
harms of ADM are where they are attempting to enter into a contract or enforce performance of a 
contract against a dominant party.122  
Not only does the contract exception inadequately protect individuals within interactions 
where they typically are the more vulnerable party, the exception also creates a hierarchy of 
interactions within the regime. This exception privileges contract creation and performance over 
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other equally important interactions.123 ADM, when used fairly, may be used to further many 
worthy objectives such as encouraging the provision of credit from lenders, or ensuring adequate 
resourcing and accurate diagnosis at public hospitals.124 Therefore it is unclear why the efficiency 
of contracting has been privileged in art 22 over other legitimate commercial or public interest 
objectives.  
V ALTERNATIVE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS  
Given that the GDPR does not offer a clear solution to the issue of ADM in the New Zealand 
context, this Part will explore two alternative legal solutions which could be adopted in to strike 
a balance between the benefits and risks of ADM for organisations and individuals. These include 
a "right to an explanation" and a compulsory consent process which could be used to vet 
organisations' proposed uses of ADM.   
A Is a "Right to an Explanation" a Solution?  
A legislative requirement of transparency or a "right to an explanation" is frequently cited as 
a desirable regulatory solution to the challenge of ADM.125 Legislation could force organisations 
to disclose the reasoning behind automated decisions to individuals, which individuals could then 
rely on to contest the decision if it was unfair.126 Greater transparency not only appears to reduce 
the likelihood that ADM processes will be unfair, but it also preserves human dignity by 
enhancing individuals' understanding of ADM processes and thus trust in these systems.   
However, a "right to an explanation" also poses several significant problems. First, private 
companies who develop their own ADM systems, or commission them, are the owners of these 
systems.127 The commercial sensitivity of ADM systems means that companies are typically 
extremely reluctant to disclose the internal workings of their algorithms for fear of losing the 
advantage over their competition.128 The proprietary and confidential nature of ADM systems 
therefore makes it very difficult for a regulator to require the disclosure of such systems to the 
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public for review.129 Secondly, even if private algorithms are disclosed, complete transparency 
over machine learning systems may provide no meaningful information about ADM processes.130 
Many ADM systems are so complex that they cannot identify the factors or reasons for their 
decisions in a way that an expert could understand, much less a lay person.131 Developments in 
explainable artificial intelligence (AI) and counterfactual systems may offer a solution to this issue 
of "explainability" in the future. 
Explainable AI or "XAI" could help to resolve the issue of opaque ADM systems.132 
Explainable AI systems are developed to ensure that the system is capable of explaining its 
reasoning in a way that is understandable to humans.133 One example of a partial use of 
explainable AI is the "why am I seeing this?" feature on the Facebook Newsfeed.134 This feature 
tells Facebook users why a certain advertisement or post is being shown to them.135 Reasons 
provided include things like "you are 18–24 years old" or "you have interacted with posts from x 
friend more than posts from others".136 However developing explainable AI typically involves a 
trade off as producing fully explainable systems often requires reducing the complexity of the 
system, and thus its accuracy.137 For example if the Facebook advertising system were to be made 
fully explainable, the multidimensional explanations that would need to be given for every ad 
would be incredibly long and complex. The only solution to make this more accessible would be 
reducing the complexity of the algorithm that decides what ads are shown, deciding what ads to 
show based on only two or three factors that can easily be explained, rather than using a highly 
sensitive, personalised algorithm that could recommend you ads tailored directly to your interests.  
Counterfactual explanations represent another possibility for increasing the transparency of 
ADM systems, without some of the drawbacks of fully explainable systems. Experts such as 
Sandra Wachter have proposed that counterfactual explanations can be used to avoid disclosing 
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the content of proprietary algorithms whilst providing individuals with an explanation for ADM 
decisions that they can understand.138  
Counterfactual explanations provide an alternative scenario, the "closest possible world" in 
which the decision outcome would have been different.139 For example, if a person was denied a 
loan because their income was under NZD 50,000 per year, then the counterfactual explanation 
for the decision would be: if your income had been greater than NZD 50,000, this loan request 
would have been accepted.140 Typically there will be multiple factors which weigh into a decision 
made by an ADM system and separate counterfactual explanations can be provided for all of these 
factors.141 Counterfactuals can provide individuals with an explanation that they understand and 
can act on, for instance individuals may contest the decision if it is based on incorrect or 
illegitimate information, or may alter their behaviour or circumstances to obtain a more favourable 
outcome in the future.142   
However, as Wachter and others point out, counterfactuals provide only some pieces of the 
puzzle. Counterfactuals do not reveal how an ADM system is working and therefore provide no 
means of ensuring that rules or patterns are being correctly identified and applied.143 In addition 
counterfactuals do not produce sufficient statistical analysis of the different data combinations to 
reveal bias or discrimination against individuals with certain attributes.144 
Neither counterfactuals nor explainable AI are currently sufficiently utilised by organisations 
to the point where "an explanation" of ADM could be feasibly mandated by law.145 However, 
even if they were, the "right to an explanation" framework still faces some significant 
philosophical issues. In most rights frameworks, the onus to enforce a right falls on the 
individual.146 It would therefore likely be up to the individual to demand that their right to an 
  
138  Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt and Chris Russell "Counterfactual Explanations Without Opening the 
Black Box: Automated Decisions and the GDPR" (2018) 31 Harv J Law and Tec 841 at 847. 
139  At 847.  
140  At 847. 
141  At 842. 
142  At 881–883.  
143  At 884. 
144  At 884. 
145  At 884; Jakko Kemper and Daan Kolkman "Transparent to whom? No algorithmic accountability without 
a critical audience" (2018) 22 Information, Communication & Society 2081 at 2086; and Zerilli and 
others, above n 7, at 4. 
146  Mike Ananny and Kate Crawford "Seeing without knowing: Limitations of the transparency ideal and its 
application to algorithmic accountability" (2016) 20 New Media & Society 973 at 977–978.  
24 (2020) 51 VUWLR 
explanation be fulfilled and to contest an automated decision if that explanation demonstrates the 
decision is unfair.147 Given the information overload that individuals are already subject to, it is 
possible that increased transparency about ADM processes will result in no meaningful 
improvement in individuals' understanding of these processes.148 Veale and Edwards warn that 
through seeking greater explainability of algorithms we run the risk of creating a "'meaningless 
transparency' paradigm", similar to the meaningless consent phenomena discussed earlier.149  
"Explainability" as a regulatory solution also assumes that effective punishment mechanisms 
are available to hold organisations accountable for any unfair or corrupt ADMs that are 
uncovered.150 As Ananny and Crawford have argued, if transparency produces no meaningful 
effects, public cynicism and distrust may be increased, undermining the initial purpose of 
implementing transparency.151 Online monopolies such as Facebook and Alphabet have 
increasingly demonstrated an ability to withstand extremely severe ethical and legal scandals and 
emerge relatively unscathed.152 It is therefore possible that a regulatory solution based on 
transparency could wind up being ineffective against these dominant companies. 
B ADM "Consents": A New Proposal 
In this sub-Part, I will outline an alternative regulatory solution which could be used in the 
New Zealand context to address the issue of ADM. My solution proposes a broader prohibition 
on ADM than art 22; it would prohibit all uses of ADM that affect individuals in any way. To 
ensure that ADM can still be used where it will be useful, and has been assessed for fairness and 
accuracy, I propose that the prohibition accompany a "consent" process, similar to the resource 
consent process used under the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA).153 This proposal is 
similar to the Swedish Data Act 1973 which prohibited personal data processing,154 but permitted 
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licences for processing to be issued by a Data Inspection Board if organisations applied for 
them.155 
Under this alternative regulatory solution, a centralised tribunal could be established to grant 
"AI consents" to organisations, permitting the use of ADM to produce decisions which affect 
individuals. The Tribunal responsible for issuing consents could use a broad balancing test to 
decide whether ADM should be used on the basis of each individual case. The test could be: 
… whether an equal balance between the interests of the organisation and the individuals subject to 
the decision making is achieved by granting a consent. 
The Tribunal could consider a range of factors when assessing whether the right balance is 
achieved. Relevant considerations could include: the significance of the decision for the 
individual; the measures taken by the organisation to ensure transparency and fairness in the 
system; whether the individual has consented to the processing; and the benefit to the organisation 
if consent was granted. Once issued, decisions would be binding on the organisation, either 
prohibiting them or permitting them to undertake the processing. The result of the consent 
application could still be appealed to the High Court by either the organisation or an affected 
individual.156  
This solution offers numerous benefits. First, it enables organisations to reap the benefits of 
ADM, but places the onus on them to ensure that their ADM processes do not subject individuals 
to discrimination. The benefits that organisations may reap from ADM are substantial, including 
increased efficiency and increased sales due to improved service offerings.157 On the other hand, 
ADM creates substantial risks for individuals, without any corresponding gain. Evidence suggests 
that ADM systems frequently exhibit biases which reflect and exacerbate historic patterns of 
inequality and marginalisation.158 It is therefore justifiable to place the cost of reducing the risk 
of potentially discriminatory results on the party who will reap the benefits of ADM.  
In addition, by using a market modality, this solution incentivises companies to implement 
good AI practices in order to successfully gain ADM consents and maintain an edge over their 
competition.159 Companies are incentivised to use counterfactuals and explainable AI because 
using these practices would increase their chances of demonstrating to the Tribunal that their 
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systems are fair and offer meaningful transparency to individuals. Longer term, these incentives 
could also drive the creation of independent "AI Auditing" firms which would use accepted 
professional processes to assess the validity and fairness of ADM systems for their clients.160  
However, one drawback of this solution could be that the process of obtaining a consent 
becomes slow. Indeed, the analogous resource consent process is often lengthy.161 This issue 
could be avoided through implementing similar timeframe requirements for decision-making by 
the Tribunal as are used in the RMA.162 Consultation with affected organisations could also be 
used to communicate and convince organisations of the benefits that they are likely to derive from 
participation in the consent process. These benefits include: potential increases in the accuracy of 
their ADM systems and a reduction of the risk that an organisation is subject to negative public 
attention as a result of unwittingly implementing discriminatory ADM systems.    
VI CONCLUSION 
Commercial values such as enabling efficiency, cost cutting and commercial competitiveness 
are frequently cited by both governments and corporations as neutral goods that regulation ought 
to support. However regulation should also uphold the rights of individuals, especially the right 
to be free from discrimination. As new technologies such as ADM penetrate our society at 
increasing rates, altering the decision-making processes which govern our lives, it is more 
important than ever before that regulation is used to balance commercial interests with the 
interests of individuals. An AI consent process is one possible way this might be achieved. 
  
160  Chowdhury and Mulani, above n 40.  
161  Nicole Pryor "Christchurch council consents too slow - Key" (17 June 2013) Stuff <www.stuff.co.nz>.  
162  RMA, s 21.  
